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IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AND THE




While judicial consideration of private rights of action said to be im-
plied by federal statutes has a relatively short history,1 treatment of the
subject has hardly been concise2 or internally consistent. Federal securi-
ties laws83 are prominent in this history and its inconsistencies. Thus,
within the past two decades, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" ('34
Act) and the Investment Advisers Act of 19405 (Advisers Act) have pro-
vided vehicles for Supreme Court articulation of remarkably contrary ap-
proaches to determining whether a federal statute6 implies a private
cause of action. In 1964, while remarking that section 14(a) of the '34 Act
implied a private cause of action, the Court stated that federal courts had
an affirmative duty of alertness to provide "remedies" necessary to effec-
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; A.B. 1951, University of Notre Dame;
LL.B 1956, LL.M (Trade Regulation) 1957, New York University; Counsel, Eaton, Van Win-
de & Greenspoon, New York, N.Y. The author gratefully acknowledges the many contribu-
tions of David C. Keiter, Esq., J.D. 1980, Dickinson School of Law.
I Various commentators cite Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) as the
initial case recognizing a private cause of action implied by federal statute. See, e.g., Craw-
ford & Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation Act: A
Practical Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 VIL. L. REv. 657, 659 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Crawford & Schneider]; McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Ac-
tion: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DIcK. L. Rzv. 167, 169 & n.14 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as McMahon & Rodos]; Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Title IX, 13 HAv.
C.R.C.L. L. Rzy. 425, 431 & n.31 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Title IX Private Rights]; Note,
Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAav. L. Rpv. 453, 485 &
n.5 (1963).
2 See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 100 S.Ct. 960, 967-68
(1980) ("[the] Court has spent too many pages identifying the factors relevant to uncovering
congressional intent to imply a private cause of action to belabor the topic here").
3 The primary federal securities laws are: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1976 & Supp. Il 1978); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1976 & Supp. II 1978); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-
79z (1976 & Supp. II 1978); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 52
(1976 & Supp. I 1978); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 21
(1976 & Supp. IH 1978).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976).
5 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
6 Standards applied when considering claims that private rights of action are implied
by the Constitution differ from those used when addressing a federal statute. See Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979); text accompanying notes 173-74 infra.
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tuate remedial purposes of legislation.7 Fifteen years later, in a decision
denying a private right of action under section 206 of the Advisers Act,
the Court effectively revoked this call to judicial activism, stressing that
the first step is determination of whether Congress intended to create a
private "cause of action".8 Although the difference between a remedy and
a cause of action is well understood, 9 the Court's rhetoric has not always
assisted in observing this distinction."0
The years between these contrary expressions of judicial policy in-
volved constant questions and inconsistent answers regarding the stan-
dards counsel and lower courts should employ in identifying implied
causes of action." Use of the "implied cause of action" legend invited
inquiry as to whether such implication properly proceeded from merely
permissive as opposed to mandatory inference. Need for authoritative in-
dicia was accentuated by the undoubted fact that the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts does not admit of the free development of a federal common
law. 2 In a unanimous 1975 decision, Cort v. Ash,'5 the Supreme Court
revealed its sensitivity to this need by elucidating four factors relevant to
determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal
statute:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit
7 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
3 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. 243, 245 (1979).
1 In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Supreme Court recently emphasized the
distinction between a remedy and a cause of action. The availability of a cause of action
involves consideration of whether the plaintiff is an appropriate party to invoke the power
of the courts to apply a substantive rule of decision. Id. at 239 & n.18. A remedy, by con-
trast, involves determination of the relief, if any, that a court may award a litigant. Id. at
240 n.18. Thus, it is conceivable for a plaintiff to have a cause of action but the forum lack a
remedy with which to vindicate his cause. Id. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,
440-43 (1977).
10 See, e.g., text accompanying note 14 infra.
" The Supreme Court has acknowledged, or at least decided questions subordinate to,
causes of action allegedly implied by a wide variety of statutes. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd.
of Elec., 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (§ 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (§ 16 of Civil Rights Act of 1870). The
Court has refused to recognize implied private rights of action under an equally wide range
of statutes. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 218, 317 (1979) (Freedom of Infor-
mation Act); National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453, 464-65
(1974) (§ 307 of Amtrak Act).
In recent years, the Court has been alert to recognizing private causes of action under
the Constitution. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472 (1980) (eighth amend-
ment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (fourth
amendment). The Carlson decision, which held that a remedy provided by the Federal Tort
Claims Act does not preclude implication of a cause of action under the eighth amendment,
will start a new line of debate over the relationship between statutory and constitutional
causes of action.
12 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
i3 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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the statute was enacted' . .. ? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a rem-
edy or to deny one?... Third, is it consistent with the underly-
ing purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff? ... [F]inally, is the cause of action one tradition-
ally relegated to the state law, in an area basically the concern for
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law.?
14
Although the Court took obvious care to tender these indicia on a nonex-
clusive basis, the styles of this listing and the entire opinion unfortu-
nately invited not only minimization of the statutory text in question in
favor of other "factors" but also equation of evidence of legislative intent
to "create... or to deny" a private cause of action with otherwise pre-
sumably subordinate considerations. While it is clear that the Court did
not intend that Cort v. Ash reissue the 1964 call to judicial activism, 5 an
effect of the unfortunate styles was to provide a rationale for quasi-legis-
lative establishment of private causes of action in the absence of any true
evidence of legislative intent. 6 This consequence, of course, served the
earlier Supreme Court invocation of a judicial duty to provide "remedies"
necessary to promote better the remedial purposes of legislation.
Although some dissatisfaction with the Cort v. Ash formulation soon
became evident in Supreme Court opinions,11 discontent of most if not all
of the sitting Justices did not become glaringly obvious until 1979. During
that year, the Court held that the fifth amendment,18 Title IX of the Ed-
ucation Amendments of 19729 and section 215 of the Advisers Act" im-
plied particularized private causes of action while comparable recogni-
tions were denied section 17(a) of the '34 Act 21 and section 206 of the
Advisers Act.22 While one of the effects of these decisions is a sharp albeit
perhaps temporary distinction between the Constitution and statutes as
predicates from which to infer private causes of action,23 two other points
14 Id. at 78.
'" See note 7 supra.
16 See Crawford & Schneider, supra note 1, at 669.
1 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977) (Burger, C. J., opin-
ion of the Court); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (White, J., opinion of the
Court).
" Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979); see text accompanying notes 165-185
infra.
19 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979); see text accompanying
notes 149-164 infra.
20 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. 243, 246-47 (1979); see text
accompanying notes 203-223 infra.
21 Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979); see text accompanying
notes 186-202 infra.
22 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. 243, 249 (1979); see text
accompanying notes 203-223 infra.
,S See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979).
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clearly emerge from the many concurrences and dissents accompanying
the 1979 decisions. Members of the Court seem unable to achieve consis-
tent agreement as how best to facilitate lower court assessments of claims
that private rights of action are implied. More importantly, there is the
glimmering of a recognition that federal courts over-extend themselves




Ancient maxims, 24 revered commentaries, 5 contemporary Restat-
ments,2' and modern treatises2 7 demonstrate that certain circumstances
may impel a common law court to acknowledge and to fashion appropri-
ate remedies for private causes of action based upon violations of public
laws which are themselves silent as to private rights to relief. A court
which honors such a tort per se theory engages in lawmaking as it gener-
ates a substantive rule of decision in which the statutory duty evidences a
duty owed the plaintiff. This is not a concept shocking to those trained in
the common law tradition. However, while the methods used by common
law courts in construing statutes may commend emulation, the power im-
plicit in the evolution of the common law differs fundamentally from fed-
eral courts' exercise of jurisdiction over civil causes asserted "under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. '28 Although a federal
common law of sorts2 9 survives the Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins0 proscrip-
tion of a "federal general common law,13 1 this survival does not provide
authority for federal courts' routine engagement in marginally permissive
inferences as to existence of private causes of action. Operation of a lim-
ited, non-diversity judicial regime which generates substantive rules of
decision presupposes "federal question" jurisdiction. Impetus for such
generation is provided by the need to insulate peculiarly federal interests
from parochialism or to accommodate the sovereign in its necessary func-
tions. Examples of such insulation or accommodation in proper operation
"' E.g., Ubi Jus, ibi Remedium (Where there is a right, there is a remedy). See gener-
ally 2A SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 55.04 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as SANDS].
14 See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CommENARMUs 23 (15th ed. 1807) (Whenever a legal
right is invaded, there is a legal remedy).
M See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
" See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
" See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938). The Supreme Court announced this decision on the same day as Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 60 (3d ed. 1976).
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78.
[Vol. XXXVII
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
are found in subjects such as government procurement programs, 2 issu-
ance or assignment of debt securities by or to the federal government,3 3
liens asserted by the federal government,3 disputes among the states"
and maintenance of public waterways' navigability.3 6
In contrast, private parties asserting that a federal public law implies
a particularized cause of action ordinarily do so to achieve federal juris-
diction. Reasons vary. Plaintiffs may be discontent with burdens of proof
imposed in, or the selection of remedies available from, non-federal fo-
rums. Nationwide service of process may suggest the desirability of a fed-
eral forum but diversity jurisdiction prove unavailable. Even more basi-
cally, the substantive content of federal law may appeal to potential
plaintiffs. Federal regulatory schemes often prescribe duties beyond those
required by state law while reserving exclusive jurisdiction to federal
courts.3 7 In any event, alleging that a cause of action is implied by federal
law involves invocation of the Constitution or other species of federal law
as existing substantive rules of decision. The preeminent issue becomes
whether private parties of a given class are entitled, in particular circum-
stances, to invoke immediate benefit of substantive rules prescribed by or
pursuant to federal law. While private parties well may argue that a fed-
eral statute, or regulation promulgated under it serves a paramount pol-
icy that would be frustrated by denial of a private cause of action, their
argument, purports to proceed from and not to the substantive rule.
B. Before Erie
Various commentators s regard the Supreme Court's 1916 decision in
Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Rigsby s as the earliest recognition
of a private cause of action implied from federal statute. Recent Supreme
Court opinions tend to perpetuate this attribution"0 but Rigsby's validity
as precedent for the current generation of implied causes of action is
dubious.
41
3 See American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640, 643-
44 (9th Cir. 1961).
3 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. As'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34 (1956).
" See, e.g., United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955).
See, e.g., Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938).
See Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 203-06 (1967).
2 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (§ 27 of '34 Act).
3 See note 1 supra.
' 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The statute considered in Rigsby provided that an employee's use
of defective rail cars did not allow his employer to assert an assumption of risk defense. The
Court interpreted this provision as mandating inference of a private cause of action. Id. at
39-40, 43.
40 See, e.g., Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579-80 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
41 Curiously, the majority's opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979) quotes language from Rigsby which emphasized that decision's common law nature.
Id. at 689 n.10. Dissenting in Cannon, Justice Powell expressed strong reservations about
1980]
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Plaintiff Rigsby was an employee of the Texas and Pacific Railway.
Injured in a fall from a rail car, Rigsby alleged his fall was caused by a
defective handhold which violated a federal safety statute. The statute
provided penal consequences but not private remedies. Rigsby originally
sued in state court but the case was removed as a result of the Railway's
federal incorporation.4 2 Recognizing a private right of action for injury
sustained by a special beneficiary of the safety statute, the majority opin-
ion stated that the right to recover "damages from the party in default is
implied according to a doctrine of the common law."'43 This reasoning was
somewhat consistent with pre-revoluntionary common law precedent con-
cerning a statute lacking any remedial or penal structure.
4
4
By reason of the defendant's federal incorporation, Rigsby was han-
dled as a "federal question". However, in the more than ninety years in
which a federal common law flourished," there was no particular pressure
to restrict generation of non-maritime substantive rules of decision by
reference to the jurisdiction exercised by a federal court. Rigsby reflects
this period. The 1916 Court used terminology and methodology appropri-
ate to a tort per se theory. It explicitly relied4 6 on a nineteenth century
Queens Bench decision47 holding that, when a remedial statute's provision
of a remedy is inadequate to the legislative purpose to protect a class of
which plaintiff is a member, a private cause of action will be made availa-
ble even though not contemplated by the statute.48 Although this reason-
continued citation of Rigsby. Id. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 222 Fed. Rep. 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1915), af'd, 241 U.S.
33 (1916). The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases of 1885, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), validated
Rigsby's removal from state to federal court as a result of the defendant's federal incorpora-
tion. Although the Supreme Court later characterized these decisions as "unfortunate," Ro-
mero v. International Term. Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.50 (1959), they were pre-
served from need for judicial overturn by a statute effecting a substantial cure. See Judicial
Code and Judiciary Amendments of 1948, § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 1329 (1948).
43 241 U.S. at 39.
4 See Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791, 791 (Q.B. 1703). Just before the American
Revolution, availability of a damage remedy was extended to one injured by violation of a
penal statute enacted to protect the class of which he was a member. See Rowning v. Good-
child, 2 Black W. 906 (1773).
41 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which permitted the development of federal com-
mon law, was decided in 1842. The Court overruled Swift in 1938. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46 241 U.S. at 39-40.
47 Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854).
41 Id. at 1197. The plaintiff in Couch was a seaman on one of the defendant's ships. The
penal statute in question mandated that shipowners stock various medicines on board ships
involved in international voyages. Plaintiff alleged that an unlawful insufficiency of
medicines aggravated a previous illness. The court held that the seaman had a damage rem-
edy. Id. The holding must be considered, however, in context of the Anglo-American policy
of paternalism toward seamen which inter alia supports provision of maintenance and cure
to seamen who are injured or become ill in the course of a voyage. See GILMORE & BLACK,
THE LAW OF APumALTY, 272-314 (2d ed. 1975). Apparently, in England, the Couch method-
ology is useful only in employee welfare contexts. See Williams, Legislation in the Law of
Torts, 23 MOD. L. Rav. 233, 244 (1960). Rigsby's holding was effectively overruled in Moore
[Vol. XXXVIEI
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
ing may be consistent with the great spirit of the common law, it is quite
different from purporting to recognize an unstated legislative intent to
provide a private cause of action.
III. Modem Evolution of Implied Rights of Actions
A. Before Borak
The modern genre of implied federal causes of action dates from the
1940's and the language of the decisions has much of its roots in popular
perceptions attending enactment of the securities regulation schemes de-
veloped in the 1930's. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.49 is widely
credited as the "seminal" case 5 holding that S.E.C. Rule 10b-55 1 implied
a private cause of action. This 1946 federal district court decision was
not, however, the first occasion upon which a court held that portions of
the '34 Act implied private rights of action.
In 1941, in Geismar v. Bond & Goodman, Inc.,52 another U.S. district
court ruled that section 29 of the '34 Act provided a vehicle for not only
rescission but also damages. 53 Plaintiff alleged a violation of section
15(c)(1) of the '34 Act" which lacked provision for a private cause of ac-
tion. Section 29 of the Act particularizes circumstances in which contracts
made in violation of the Act, or regulations promulgated thereunder, are
rendered void.55 Inference of a right to rescission would seem mandated
by a statutory characterization of voidness. This is particularly so when,
as in the case of section 29(b) of the '34 Act, characterizing the contract
as void is designed to operate against violators and their knowing succes-
sors in interest.56 The Geismar court failed to explain, however, how one
makes the transition from the equitable remedy of rescission to the legal
remedy of damages.
In 1944, the Second Circuit decided two cases central to the evolution
of implied causes of action.5 7 The first was somewhat cryptic. In Baird v.
Franklin," the majority affirmed a district court's dismissal of a cause of
v. C. & 0 Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934).
" 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
"o See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
51 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1979).
51 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
53 Id. at 878.
- 15 U.S.C. § 780(c)(1) (1976).
15 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976). Section 29 of the '34 Act has analogues in other securities
statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 79z (1976) (§ 26 of Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (1976) (§ 47 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940). Only the '34 Act,
however, bestows exclusive jurisdiction on a federal district court.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b)(1) & (2) (1976).
In 1944, the Supreme Court also recognized a private federal cause of action implied
in the Railway Labor Act for a railway employee whose collective bargaining representatives
indulged racial discrimination. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S.
210, 213 (1944).
- 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
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action allegedly implied by section 6(b) of the '34 Act.59 The trial court
had dismissed the case as a result of the plaintiff's failure to prove dam-
ages.60 Section 6(b), under which national securities exchanges are gov-
erned, does not expressly provide a private cause of action. Plaintiff al-
leged actionable injury from an exchange's failure to enforce its own rules
for member firms. Affirming dismissal for failure to prove damages, the
majority opinion merely assumed availability of a cause of action. Pur-
porting to dissent as to the damage issue, Judge Clark advanced a lengthy
argument concerning the liberality with which he thought courts should
approach assessment of causes allegedly implied in the federal securities
laws. 1 Although his argument was gratuitous in context of the case's dis-
position, it is nonetheless notable not only for the methodology endorsed
but also for the role Judge Clark played in another Second Circuit impli-
cation decision in 1944.62
In his Baird dissent, Judge Clark maintained that failure to recognize
an implied private cause of action under section 6(b) would convert the
Act's "avowed purpose of 'reasonably complete and effective' protection"
into "a snare and a delusion."6 3 Buttressing his fear of the public rela-
tions consequences from denying a cause of action with somewhat more
judicial observations, Judge Clark cited the Rigsby case for the proposi-
tions that failure of a statute to provide "machinery or procedure" to ac-
quit an individual right is immaterial to judicial ability to fashion a rem-
edy, and that members of a class, for whose protection a statute creates a
duty, may sue for injuries resulting from a breach of that duty. He re-
jected the argument that, since other sections" of the '34 Act expressly
provide private rights of action, the doctrine of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius"5 precludes inference of an intent to provide a cause under
section 6(b). Contending that the express causes of action provided more
unrestricted recoveries than possible at common law, Judge Clark made
oblique reference to the statement in section 28(a) of the '34 Act 6 that all
rights and remedies of the Act supplement those already existing at law
and in equity. He did so as a prelude to opining that traditional rules of
statutory construction are subordinated to a principle that courts will
construe "details" of an act in conformity with its dominant purpose.
6 7
Unexplained were how inferences of legislative intent to imply not only a
cause of action but also attachment of federal judicial jurisdiction are rel-
59 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976).
60 141 F.2d at 239.
6- Id. at 240-46 (Clark, J., dissenting).
62 Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
6- 141 F.2d at 245 (Clark, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(c) (1976) (§ 9(c)); 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1976) (§ 16); 15 U.S.C. §
78r(a) (1976) (§ 18(a)).
e5 The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. See generally 2A SANDs,
supra note 24, § 47.23.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976).
" 141 F.2d at 245. (Clark, J., dissenting).
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egated to being mere details. While the dissent may be criticized for mis-
citing authority,68 variations on Judge Clark's analytically questionable
theme are encountered throughout the modern history of implied causes
of action.
Later in 1944, Judge Clark presided over a merger of the Geismar the-
sis69 with his tort per se approach to supplementing the securities acts.
Goldstein v. Groesbeck70 involved "double derivative" actions on behalf
of four operating subsidiaries. Plaintiff, a shareholder in the subsidiaries'
holding company, sought an accounting for profits generated by another
affiliate as a result of contracts with the operating companies. These con-
tracts allegedly violated section 4(a)(2) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act (PUHCA).71 Section 26(b) of the PUHCA7 2 stipulates void-
ness in much the same manner as section 29 of the '34 Act. 3 Both stat-
utes provide penal sanctions." Judge Clark rejected the defendant's con-
tention that section 4(a)(2) did not provide a private cause of action,
writing that such a result would be inconsistent with the legislative policy
underlying PUHCA and that private enforcement under the analagous
section 29 of the '34 Act was sanctioned in Geismar. Finally, Judge Clark
opined that public expectations of vigorious securities law enforcement
compelled recognition of a private cause of action.7 5 Thus, in context of a
fear of frustrating rising expectations, a judicially-perceived incomplete-
ness of PUHCA § 26(b) was cured and the path cleared to an implied
"remedy" in the nature of accounting.
In the previously noted Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.76 case, the
federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania relied on
Rigsby77 but articulated a broader ground for decision. Responding to ar-
gument that Rule 10b-5 does not imply a private cause of action because
Congress expressly provided civil causes of action under other sections of
the '34 Act,78 the court stated that the general purposes of the Act compel
conclusion that "the mere omission of an express provision for civil liabil-
ity is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies. ' 79 Thus, in
Kardon, it was not section 10(b) of the '34 Act or Rule 10b-5 which im-
"Judge Clark's Baird dissent relied on S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943) for the proposition that courts should construe the details of an act in accordance
with the generally expressed legislative policy of the act. 141 F.2d at 245 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing). It must be noted, however, that Joiner involved construction of only a part of the
statutory definition of a "security." 320 U.S. at 350-55.
" See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
70 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
11 15 U.S.C. 9 78d(a)(2) (1976).
7' 15 U.S.C. 9 79z(b) (1976).
,1 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1976).
7" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff, 78z-3 (1976).
75 142 F.2d at 427.
Is 69 F.2d 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
7 Id. at 513.
73 See note 64 supra.
7' 69 F. Supp. at 514.
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plied a private cause of action but some "general law" other than the
Constitution or a federal statute. The Court perceived this "general law"
to be so pervasive that the burden was on defendant to demonstrate a
legislative intent to deny a cause of action or remedy. The ultimate hold-
ing did not rest on Rule 10b-5 alone. Rather, the court noted that the
cause of action could also be grounded upon section 29(b).s0 Although
Kardon involved an accounting, the court explicitly endorsed the Geis-
mar holding as to the availability of not only rescission but also
damages.81
The interval between the Kardon decision in 1946 and what proved to
be an operationally seminal decision of the Supreme Court in J.L Case v.
Borak8' was not unproductive. For example, the Supreme Court inter-
preted section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act"3 as authorizing federal courts
to fashion a body of federal law for enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements.8 Lower courts contributed by recognizing private causes im-
plied by such statutes as the Federal Communications Act 5 and the Civil
Aeronautics Act.86 This interval also witnessed the Supreme Court's re-
fusal, in T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,8" to infer a private cause of ac-
tion from the Motor Carrier Act's s prohibition of unjust and unreasona-
ble charges.88 The Court, however, decided the case in the context of an
agency's possession of primary jurisdiction over the carrier-defendant.
The decision was followed shortly by Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern
Freightways, Inc.90 which addressed a different carrier malpractice in
dramatically different terms. In context of the same regulatory scheme,
the Hewitt-Robins court considered the effect of denying a remedy for
misrouting. Since denial of a cause of action would leave shippers helpless
against erring carriers, the Court presumed that Congress did not intend
this result.9 ' Whereas the T.LM.E. decision held that neither statutory
language nor legislative history supported inference of a private cause,
the majority opinion in Hewitt-Robins went further by considering
whether recognition of a cause of action would be inconsistent with the
Act's legislative purpose. The holding was for plaintiff and in such terms
as to invite recognition of statutorily unstated private rights of action
when their effect would serve the legislative purpose.
80 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
81 69 F. Supp. at 514.
82 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Prior to Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), Borak was the leading
Supreme Court decision concerning implication of private causes from federal statutes.
- 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
" Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1956).
s' 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
49 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
s 49 U.S.C. § 316(b) & (d) (1976).
371 U.S. 84 (1962).
91 Id. at 89.
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It is impossible to reconcile these decisions, only three years apart, as
the product of normal judicial progress. A head count of the Justices in-
volved offers some clue as to the sources of a changing philosophy on the
Court. Only Justice Brennan was in the majority in both T.I.M.E. and
Hewitt-Robins. Justices Goldberg and White joined the Court after
T.I.M.E., replacing Justices Frankfurther and Whittaker who had been in
the T.I.M.E. majority. The Hewitt-Robins decision, which predated
Borak by two years, was the first manifestation of the Court's new orien-
tation and Justice Clark wrote for the majority in each.
B. Borak's Call to Duty
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,92 the Court considered a consummated
merger in context of disaffected shareholder charges that proxy solicita-
tion material pertinent to securing shareholder approval had been false
and misleading in violation of S.E.C. Rule 14a-9.9 3 The trial court ruled
that the '34 Act limited its power to granting declaratory relief under sec-
tion 27 and that, consequently it lacked the power to redress alleged vio-
lation of the Act." Section 27 describes the exclusive jurisdiction of U.S.
district courts under the '34 Act. This grant includes "all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by the
Act or regulations promulgated thereunder." 95 While the Supreme Court's
holding purported to deal only with the narrow issue of section 27's
scope,96 the majority's opinion says more and, although the superfuity can
be characterized as dictum, much has been done by reference to it.
Unlike Rigsby,97 the Borak defendants made no concessions. Rather,
they squarely asserted that Congress did not contemplate a private right
of action in section 14(a).98 Although treating section 27 as dispositive,
Justice Clark outlined a rationale for inferring a cause of action under
section 14(a). His reasoning proceeded from an undoubted congressional
desire to foster fair corporate suffrage for purchasers of equities traded on
public exchanges.99 It must be borne in mind that, absent SEC rule-mak-
ing, section 14(a) is inoperative. Justice Clark found that the standards
provided by Congress for SEC implementation of section 14(a) "evi-
2 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1979). The S.E.C. promulgated Rule 14a-9 pursuant to the
authority of § 14(a) of the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Section 14(a) prohibits solici-
tation of proxies in contravention of rules promulgated by the S.E.C. Rule 14a-9 prohibits
certain types of deceptive conduct in connection with proxy solicitation. Id. See generally E.
ARANow & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 463-76 (2d ed. 1968).
" 377 U.S. at 427-28.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
377 U.S. at 428.
" See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
, 377 U.S. at 431.
Id. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
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denced" the broad remedial purposes of the statute. 100 These standards
are phrased in the not uncommonly broad terms of being "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 10 1
This language, of course, is the expression of a Congress constitutionally
compelled to provide standards for delegations of rule-making authority
and desireous of effecting such provision without unduly limiting a
fledgling regulatory agency. Justice Clark put the standards, with itali-
cized emphasis on "protection of investors '10 2 to yet another and more
creative use.
Having noted section 14(a)'s remedial purpose, he dealt with fulfill-
ment of that purpose in the following broad language:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary sup-
plement to Commission action. As in antitrust treble damage liti-
gation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves
as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy re-
quirements .... Time does not permit an independent examina-
tion of the facts set out in the proxy material and this results in
the Commission's acceptance of the representations . . . at their
face value, unless contrary to other material on file ....
We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.103
Although this passage is widely cited, it is analytically suspect on several
grounds. Antitrust plaintiffs, for example, pursue treble damages in reli-
ance on an express, rather than implied, statutory cause of action and
remedy.1 4 Furthermore, SEC authority to promulgate rules under section
14(a) gives the Commission control of the time equation in proxy data
clearance. This control, of course, is subject to the practical limitations
implicit in Congress' continuing power over appropriations. Finally, it was
the Court and not Congress which found that private enforcement of the
proxy rules is "necessary." The '34 Act, of course, now embraces many
over-the-counter equities and their issuers"0 5 and subjects them to the
proxy solicitation rules on the same basis as listed companies. How is it
that a Congress that originally "recognized" the virtues of private en-
forcement of the proxy rules governing both listed companies and there-
after amended the Act to bring significant over-the-counter companies
within the rules' ambit, never thought of the simple expedient of subject-
ing all materially misleading proxy solicitations affecting commerce to
private causes of action? This could have been done easily and without
'00 377 U.S. at 431-32.
101 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
102 377 U.S. at 432.
103 Id. at 432-33.
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 13, 14 & 15 (1976).
105 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
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burdening the SEC with review of all proxy data. The jurisdictional
sweep of section 10(b) provides an example. Nevertheless, from Borak
dictum, all else flowed for many years. 1°8 While it is unnecessary to bela-
bor popularity of implied causes of action,107 it should be noted that com-
mentators maintain that such causes are a remarkably significant factor
in the greatly increasing case loads of federal courts."0 8
The early 1970's saw a continuation of the Court's expansive treat-
ment of implied private rights of action. In 1970, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the burden of proof implicit in private prosecutions under section
14(a) and developed the range of remedies available under it.109 In a 1971
decision, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., °0
the Supreme Court first gave explicit recognition to Rule 10b-5's status in
private litigation. In a gratuitous footnote to the majority opinion written
by Justice Douglas, the Loss treatise on securities regulation"1 was cited
for the proposition that a private right of action was implied in section
10(b).
112
Citation to the Loss treatise was curious. Professor Loss, noting that
the entire 10b-5 superstructure had been erected without a square ruling
by the Supreme Court on the existence of a private cause,13 had indi-
cated considerable disquiet with the proposition. He offered several
points of distinction between section 10(b) and the Borak context:
whereas there was little state law bearing on proxy solicitation, inference
of a private remedy from Rule 10b-5 displaces a considerable body of
state law; the broad enforcement rationale of Borak does not apply so
readily to Rule 10b-5 actions; and the '34 Act provides three private
rights of actions which are more closely analogous to Rule 10b-5 than
they are to the proxy rules." 4 Also remarked was the problem that buy-
ers' successful invocations of l0b-5 have the potential to evade restric-
tions Congress imposed upon civil actions expressly created by sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)."18 Despite his reservations,
Professor Loss projected that the Supreme Court was not likely to prick
the 10b-5 "bubble" because of the Court's readiness to afford private
106 See, e.g., Pitt, Standing To Sue Under The Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A
Leaky Boat on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117, 119-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Pitt].
107 See note 11 supra. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
10 See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 106, at 118-19 n.6.
I" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-89 (1970).
110 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
1 6 L. Loss, SEcuRrras REGULATMN 3869-73 (1969 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
112 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
18 6 Loss, supra note 111, at 3869.
114. Id. at 3870.
115 Id. Several commentators contend that Rule 10b-5 should not provide relief for de-
frauded purchasers of a security. See, e.g., Freeman, Implied Remedies Under Rule 10b-5:
Are They Only For Defrauded Sellers?, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 26.
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causes when they aid the general objectives of the securities statutes;116
utility of section 29(b) when the parties are in appropriate relationship;
and, broad lower court acceptance of private actions under Rule lOb-5.117
Can it be that Justice Douglas' sense of humor was at play when he cited
the Loss masterwork?
However that may be, there is no escape from the facts that Borak's
essential reliance was on a jurisdictional rather than a substantive provi-
sion and that Justice Clark's unnecessary and unfortunately-phrased ex-
cursion concerning section 14(a) was subsequently taken to sanction lower
courts' performance of a legislative oversight function dedicated to imple-
menting presumed congressional purposes. While propriety of such dedi-
cation is an obvious question in terms of the separation of powersll8
lower courts' dutiful response to the Borak Court's evocation of "alertness
to provide remedies" cannot be doubted.119
C. The Retreat from Borak
The opinion written for a unanimous Court in Cort v. Ash 20 reflects a
great effort to restrain overenthusiasm in inferring causes of action while
seeking to avoid explicit repudiation of Borak. Cort's aftermath suggests
that it represented an uneasy compromise and a considerable communi-
cation failure among participating Justices.
While Cort was not a securities case, it involved a corporate matter.
Plaintiff petitioned a federal district court to compel corporate directors
to account for funds expended in an alleged violation of a criminal statute
proscribing corporate political contributions on the federal level. The
Third Circuit reversed summary judgment for defendants, thereby recog-
nizing propriety of a private cause of action under the statute. 121 Revers-
ing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that such "relief" was
not available under the federal statute "itself" and oriented the parties to
seek whatever relief was available under the laws of the state of
incorporation .122
Articulating its reasoning, the Court identified several factors relevant
to determining whether a private "remedy" is implicit in a statute.,2
These factors, which were previously noted 1 2' deserve repetition although
116 6 Loss, supra note 111, at 3870-71.
117 Id. at 3871.
118 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
"9 See, e.g., L. JENNINGS & W. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES & MATERIALS
844-1088 (4th ed. 1977); Pitt, The Long Arm of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, in
ALI-ABA COURSEBOOK ON FRAUD, INSIDE INFORMATION, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER RULE
10b-5 9-125 (1975).
12 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
121 Id. at 77.
122 Id. at 77-78.
123 Id. at 78.
I", See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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the author takes the liberty of reordering them. "[I]ndication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one" was listed as the second factor. The third consideration, although
seemingly better stated as a sub-part of the intent inquiry, concerned
whether the "remedy" in question is consistent with the "underlying pur-
poses of the legislative scheme." First was an inquiry, drawn from Rigsby,
as to whether plaintiff is "one of the. class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted." This factor essentially involves a determination of
whether the plaintiff has standing to sue. The final factor is an inquiry as
to whether the "cause of action" is one traditionally "relegated" to state
rather than federal law.125
Use of the word "relegated" in the fourth Cort factor is intriguing.
The Court probably was not addressing the reservation effected by the
tenth amendment of the Constitution2" since, by definition, matters re-
served to the states are not subject to regulation by Congress or federal
courts. Presumably, then, Justice Brennan considered congressional fail-
ure to exert its maximum authority under, for example, the commerce
clause2127 as equivalent to an affirmative dispensation from that authority.
Even if this dubious proposition were acceptable, only Congress could be
the relegating body. If Congress explicitly or implicitly creates a federal
cause of action, it is not within the power of federal courts to dispense
with or abstain from enforcement of such a right merely because they
deem state remedies to be adequate to the legislative purpose. A clue to
what may have been meant is found in the Court's citation of Borak in
support of the fourth factor. In Borak, Justice Clark observed that limit-
ing Rule 14a-9 plaintiffs to declaratory relief would force victims of con-
summated mergers, approved through use of deceptive proxy solicita-
tions, to rely on state courts for relief in which event, if the law of an
appropriate state failed to provide relief, the whole purpose of section
14(a) would be frustrated.128 By way of contrast observed by Justice
Brennan, the Cort plaintiffs seemed to have potentials for ultra vires and
breach of fiduciary duty claims both of which are traditionally recognized
by states.
12 9
The first Cort factor does not merit detailed examination. The Su-
preme Court has become very conscious of standing and comparable con-
siderations. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,so concerning
standing in Rule 10b-5 damage actions, was decided just eight days before
Cort. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co.,1 31 which involved standards for pri-
125 422 U.S. at 78. It is difficult to consider the "fourth" Cort factor complementary to
the other three unless one views federal courts as generators of substantive rules of decision.
126 U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
377 U.S. at 434-35.
129 422 U.S. at 84.
230 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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vate injunctive relief under section 13(d) of the '34 Act,132 was handed
down on the same day as Cort. Blue Chip and Rondeau were not unani-
mous decisions. Justices Brennan and Douglas were among the dissenters
in each. It is important to note that, in Cort, Justice Brennan amplified
somewhat concerning standing. The Court, in dictum, declined to rule
that an exclusively criminal statute may never imply a private cause of
action. Hypothetical reference was made to the potency for recognition of
private rights of action to acquit the interests of a special group for whom
statutory protection was intended.13, 3 However, intent to protect share-
holders was regarded as "at best a subsidiary purpose" of the statute at
issue in Cort since Congress' purpose was to destroy corporate influence
over elections.134
Although the issue of legislative intent to imply a private cause of ac-
tion necessarily becomes enmeshed with the question of standing, the
Cort decision accorded legislative intent an understated treatment not
entirely inconsistent with Hewitt-Robins. Justice Brennan opined that,
when federal law has granted a class certain protections, it is not neces-
sary to demonstrate an affirmative congressional intent to create a private
cause of action although explicit intent to deny a cause of action would be
controlling.13 5 Thus, if rights can be said to be granted as a principal pur-
pose of legislation, Cort's teaching had it that prudent defendants would
do well to discover and brief congressional intent both to deny a private
cause of action and to limit remedies.
Justice Brennan's attempt to amplify all four factors provided oppor-
tunity for inconsistent lower court interpretations of the Cort decision.
Although the case could have been decided solely on legislative intent or
standing grounds, superfluous amplification concerning consistency of
remedies with regulatory purposes entailed recall of the Borak exhorta-
tion to judicial alertness to the ultimate but unnecessary effect, in Cort,
that a private remedy would not aid the primary congressional goal of the
legislation.3 6 To be sure, recovery of funds illicitly spent to influence a
past election cannot undo the abuse addressed by Congress but unneces-
sary laboring of this point opened the door to argument, in later cases,
that private rights of action should be recognized whenever the effect
would be immediately supportive of a congressionally-defined purpose. If,
however, the consistency factor is only a remedial consideration and
thereby subordinate to prior recognition of intent to provide a cause of
action, the Cort decision was not nearly so threatening.
Various commentators viewed Cort as addressing the process by which
131 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
13 422 U.S. at 80 (dictum).
134 Id.
"5 Id. at 82. Cort v. Ash is similar in concept, if not in language, to the Kardon hold-
ing. See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
131 Id. at 84.
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implied "causes of action" are recognized.137 Later decisions, however,
compel a careful rereading of Cort and recognition that Justice Brennan's
explicit declination of the term "relief" was responsive to the Third Cir-
cuit's holding that "damage relief was proper to the statute in
question."138
D. After Borak
In 1977, the Supreme Court provided two clues that Cort v. Ash was
far from the last word about recognition of implied causes of action. In
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,39 the Court considered whether an
unsuccessful tender offeror has an implied cause of action for damages
under section 14(e) of the '34 Act.14 0 Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Burger denied existence of such a cause. Having failed to find even a
"hint" in the legislative history of section 14(e) that Congress intended to
benefit a losing contender, 44 Chief Justice Burger considered the plain-
tiff's claim in the Cort v. Ash mode. Piper's theory of action was found
wanting in terms of each Cort factor and all of Justice Brennan's "rem-
edy" usages were respected in a rhetorical sense. This is significant since
the Chief Justice took care to avoid foreclosing non-contesting sharehold-
ers 42 from a private cause of action under section 14(e). Nevertheless, on
an explicit level, it was the cause of action which was denied. Concurring
in the result, Justice Blackmun joined the dissenters' premise that the
plaintiff enjoyed standing to prosecute a cause of action under section
14(e). He maintained that the plaintiff failed to establish causation.
1 43
Justice White authored the majority opinion in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green.144 The direct holding of the case was that Rule 10b-5, ab-
sent deceptive or manipulative conduct, does not provide a cause of ac-
tion for shareholders squeezed-out in an allegedly unfair short-form
merger. '" Acknowledging availability of a Rule 10b-5 claim under certain
circumstances, Justice White cited Piper for the proposition that a pri-
vate cause of action should not be recognized where it is unnecessary to
ensure fulfillment of a congressional purpose.'" Citing both Piper and
Cort, availability of an appraisal remedy under statute law was taken to
militate against the need for a federal cause of action. This was modified
by an observation to the effect that existence of a particular state remedy
137 See, e.g., McMahon & Rodos, supra note 1, at 187; Crawford & Schneider, supra
note 1, at 659; Title IX Private Rights, supra note 1, at 433.
"ss See 422 U.S. at 77-78.
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
uo Id. at 4; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
24 430 U.S. at 35.
"4 Id. at 42 n.28.
141 Id. at 51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
I's Id. at 474.
146 Id. at 477.
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is not dispositive of whether Congress intended to provide a similar rem-
edy. 7 This came as a relief to those who feared use of the fourth Cort
factor as an instrument appropriate to boot-strapping a federal cause of
action. Much of Justice White's invocation of Piper and Cort was in a
part of the opinion from which Justices Blackmun and Stevens, otherwise
concurring in part, explicitly abstained.
4 8
After Santa Fe and Piper, the Supreme Court did not long delay fur-
ther reconsideration of formulae appropriate to identifying implied causes
of action. Nineteen hundred and seventy-nine proved to be a banner year
for Supreme Court treatment of implied private rights of action.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,' 9 plaintiff alleged that her sex
had been the criterion for denial of admission to two medical schools by
reason of which she enjoyed a cause of action 5" under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.15 Title IX does not provide an express
private right of action but contemplates administrative action to cut off
federal funding for institutions violating the Title's section 901. After de-
cisions adverse to petitioner in U.S. district court and the court of ap-
peals, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of
1976152 which authorizes awards to prevailing private parties in Title IX
actions inter alia. The Seventh Circuit then granted a rehearing but con-
cluded that its original conclusion was correct and that the later 1976 Act
could not be taken to create a Title IX remedy. 153
The Supreme Court held for plaintiff. Justice Stevens wrote for the
majority. Although concurring in not only the judgment but also the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurrence in which
Justice Stewart joined. The Chief Justice concurred in the result but did
not offer a concurring opinion. Justices Powell and White provided dis-
senting opinions in the latter of which Justice Blackmun joined.
The majority opinion relied heavily on the facts that Congress
modeled Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641" and that
six lower courts recognized an implied Title VI private right of action
before passage of Title IX. Justice Stevens also remarked a belief that
there was ample evidence that Congress contemplated private remedies to
supplement enforcement of Title IX. 55 He nevertheless paid lengthy
homage to the four Cort factors and, as the Chief Justice did in Piper,
paid considerable editorial respect to Justice Brennan's plainly deliberate
choice of the word "remedy" in connection with the Cort factors. How-
147 Id. at 478.
148 Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
15 Id. at 680 n.2.
1 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
1 441 U.S. at 683; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1077-80 (7th Cir.
1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
155 441 U.S. at 694-703.
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ever, Justice Stevens declined to weigh the Cort factors since all of them
supported the same result. Justice Steven's closing comments suggested
that a behind-the-scene battle was likely to emerge into public view. Con-
ceding that Congress should be explicit about private causes of action
when it means them to exist, Justice Stevens argued that "certain limited
circumstances" nonetheless justify recognition that failure of Congress to
do so is not inconsistent with an intent to create such a remedy. 156
The succinct Rehnquist-Stewart concurrence pointed out that the ma-
jority's statutory construction approach differed significantly from the
analysis employed in cases such as Borak. 1 7 This concurrence also recog-
nized the essential difference between federal and common law courts but
did so without derogation of federal courts' duty to determine whether
Congress intended to create a private cause. Recognizing that cases such
as Borak may have misled Congress into believing that the courts would
relieve it from the burden of deciding refined policy questions, Justice
Rehnquist warned that recent decisions make it clear that Congress
should begin to retake an active role in providing private remedies.156
Via a footnote, Justice Powell endorsed the idea that past Supreme
Court decisions had relieved Congress from considering difficult cause of
action questions but he argued that it does not follow that the Court is
obliged so to indulge Congress.159 Justice Powell's dissent is impressive
for its research, thoughtfulness and expression. Concluding that federal
courts should not infer a private cause of action "[a]bsent the most com-
pelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent,"16 0 he asserted that
the Cort mode of analysis is inconsistent with the separation of powers. 1"
Describing Cort's predecessors as a haphazard line of decisions, Justice
Powell characterized Cort's four factors as an open invitation to judicial
legislation. The legitimacy of citation to Rigsby is also called into ques-
tion,16 2 and Borak is cast as an aberrant interpretation of a federal regula-
tory statute.16 3 In terms of what must have been the argument in confer-
ence, the most important aspect of Powell's dissent may have been a
reminder that the Erie court, when satisfied as to error perpetrated in
Swift v. Tyson, did not attempt to construct a half-way position.""
Davis v. Passman"1 5 confirmed existence of not only a private cause of
action under the Fifth Amendment but also a damage remedy to acquit
the objectives of the due process clause.166 The issue, sex discrimination,
1" Id. at 711.
157 Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
15 "[T]he ball, so to speak, may well now be in" Congress. Id.
159 Id. at 743 n.14 (PoweU, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 731.
"I' Id. at 730.
162 Id. at 732.
1,3 Id. at 736.
' See id. at 742.
148 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
16 Id. at 244-45.
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was presented in an unusual context. Plaintiff was fired from a job in the
office of a member of Congress in order to accommodate the congress-
man's conviction that a man could better handle the position. The Repre-
sentative spelled out his purpose in a letter of dismissal.167 Section 717 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is designed to protect federal employ-
ees from invidious discrimination, omits non-civil service congressional
employees.16 8 Plaintiff brought suit under the fifth amendment, seeking
back pay and reinstatement with appropriate consideration for lost pro-
motion and salary increase opportunities. The district court dismissed for
want of a cause of action. A Fifth Circuit panel reversed but was itself
reversed by the court sitting en banc.169 Using the Cort factors, the Fifth
Circuit held that the due process clause does not imply a right of action
and that the proposed damage remedy was not constitutionally
compelled.
1 7 0
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed as to availabil-
ity of the damage action. The Court held that the plaintiff had stated a
cause of action and that relief in the form of damages is an appropriate
remedy.17 1 Defendant's departure from office mooted the equity issues.
The Court, however, remanded the case to the Circuit Court for consider-
ation of congressional immunity issues.
172
Justice Brennan wrote for the majority. Dissenting opinions were writ-
ten by the Chief Justice as well as Justices Stewart and Powell. Justice
Rehnquist joined in all of the dissents. The Chief Justice and Justice
Powell indulged reciprocal endorsements.
The majority opinion ruled that the Fifth Circuit erred when it ap-
plied the Cort factors to assess the enforcement of Constitutional rights
because such an inquiry is fundamentally different from consideration of
who may enforce a statutory right.173 A Cort analysis was said to be ap-
propriate to divining congressional intent underlying complex legislation
which authorizes others to introduce even greater complexity whereas the
Constitution speaks with majestic simplicity resistant to Cort analyses
absent constitutional commitment of an issue to a coordinate function.
The majority presumed that justiciable constitutional rights are to be en-
forced through the courts. This presumption was indulged for the very
good reason that, if individuals have no effective means to enforce consti-
tutional rights, such rights become ephemeral or, in the word of the ma-
jority, "precatory." 117 4 Since Davis had no avenue of vindication other
167 Id. at 230 n.3.
1" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976).
169 571 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1978).
170 Id. at 800-01.
7 Davis v. Passman, 422 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1979).
171 Id. at 249.
173 Id. at 241.
174 Id. at 245. Survival of the presumption that courts will enforce justiciable constitu-
tional rights is dependent upon Congress' benign use of its power to define the jurisdiction
of federal courts. See Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1481-85 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
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than the courts, the Court held that she was a proper party to invoke
federal jurisdiction for the disposition of her fifth amendment cause of
action.
Justice Brennan then considered availability of a damage remedy. The
opinion placed principal reliance on Bell v. Hood'1 5 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.17 In the
former, the Court sustained the concept that federal courts could enjoin
state officials from acts contravening the fourteenth amendment and ob-
served that, when "legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done. ' 17 7 Bivens held
that a damage remedy was available for a violation of fourth amendment
rights unless special factors demand "hesitation.' 7 8 The nature of such
factors presents courts with troubling application problems which can be
alleviated only by balancing distinct constitutional concerns of general
application when their particular applications come into conflict. The ad
hoc majority seems sympathetic to such balancing. In Davis, a possibility
that the speech and debate clause17 9 may have immunized Congressman
Passman's action was held sufficient to demand "hesitation" abiding cir-
cuit court resolution. 80 Another interesting aspect of the case is the re-
versal of the classic formula that equity acts when the law cannot afford a
remedy. Since the equitable remedy of reinstatement was impossible be-
cause of the Congressman's retirement in the wake of a losing primary
run, damages were Davis' only opportunity for relief.'8'
The Chief Justice avoided the cause of action and remedy issues, ex-
pressing concern for the separation of powers in the context of a Con-
gressman's need to be assured of total loyalty from his staff. 82 Justice
Powell expanded on the separation of powers thesis. He maintained that
the majority opinion is susceptible of interpretation as a shift from Biv-
dissenting).
175 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
1276 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
177 327 U.S. at 684.
178 403 U.S. at 396.
'70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The Speech and Debate clause serves to insulate Congress
from executive or judicial pressures in order that the members of Congress may freely per-
form their legislative tasks. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969). The clause
is applicable in both criminal and civil proceedings. See Eastland v. United States Service-
man's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1975). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtrmONAL
LAw § 5-18 (1978).
'50 The Fifth Circuit refrained from addressing whether the Speech and Debate clause
immunized Passman from suit and the Supreme Court deferred for the time. 442 U.S. at 235
n.11.
281 Id. at 245. Proceeding predominately via footnotes, Justice Brennan afforded an in-
teresting lecture concerning connotations of "jurisdiction", "standing", "cause of action"
and "relief". Id. at 237 n.15, 238 n.16, 239 nn. 17 & 18. Regretably he did not extend his
labors to "infer" or "imply".
182 Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ens' recognition that, in appropriate circumstances, a federal court may
exercise principled discretion to infer a private cause of action from the
Constitution to a Borak-like duty to imply a right of action whenever an
effective alternative seems lacking.188
Despite a bias favoring the Davis result and a belief that it is entirely
supportable, the author is concerned about the methodology the opinion
can be taken to suggest. He would be more comfortable if Justice Bren-
nan's particularized formulations called for plaintiff to plead and to
demonstrate lack of another effective means of acquitting personalized
constitutional rights. There should be no room to argue that a defendant
is burdened with negating a presumption erected on plaintiff's claim. In
terms of applications, the plaintiff in Davis would not seem to have been
prejudiced by need for such a demonstration. The fact that the circuit
court would have left her without a judicial remedy cannot be taken, on
some sort of a modified res ipsa loquitor basis, to demonstrate need to
infer a cause of action in comparable cases. The majority's language can
be interpreted to justify such a quantum leap."8
E. Rethinking Cort
The facts underlying Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 85 instantly stir
memories of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.188 Touche Ross, a distin-
guished auditing firm, was retained by a brokerage house to audit its
books and prepare reports to S.E.C. and an Exchange. The brokerage
house failed. Redington, a court-appointed trustee, and the Securities In-
vestor Protection Corporation (SIPC) charged that Touche Ross' im-
proper audit techniques resulted in a failure to discover the brokerage's
falsification of financial reports. As a consequence of this falsification,
certain of the auditors' reports to the Exchange and a certification of the
brokerage's statements were incorrect.1 87 Plaintiff predicated his damage
action on several theories including a breach of duty owed to investors
185 Id. at 252-55 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 245.
185 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
188 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Ernst & Ernst, the defendants allegedly performed a negli-
gent audit which failed to uncover that the president of the company was embezzling large
sums of money. Id. at 188-90. The Court ruled that the defendant was not liable under Rule
10b-5 since scienter, rather than negligence, is required in a private damage action. Id. at
215. See generally Maher & Blasi, Lessons from Ernst & Ernst-Enforcement Proceedings
and the Uncommon Law of Rule 10b-5, 82 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1977). This year, the Court
ruled that scienter is the requisite culpability standard in SEC injunctive actions under
Rule 10b-5 although such is not the rule under § 17(a)(2-3) of the '33 Act. SEC v. Aaron,
100 S.Ct. 1945, 1952 (1980). Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, many
lower courts consider reckless behavior sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. See, e.g.,
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastmen Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S.
1039 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977).
1687 442 U.S. at 565-66.
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under section 17(a) of the '34 Act 88 which does not expressly provide a
private cause of action.
Unlike sections 10(b), 14(a) and 15(a)(1) of the Act, section 17(a) is
not introduced with the "It shall be unlawful . . ." rubric. Rather, the
section demands that exchanges, registered broker-dealers, and others in
the securities trading business observe minimum record-keeping and re-
porting rules promulgated by S.E.C. for investor protection. S.E.C. Rule
17a-5 directs that independent auditors be retained to verify brokers'
reports.""9
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit reversed 90 a district court's dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action. 19 1 In a seven to one decision, in
which Justice Powell did not participate, the Supreme Court held for the
auditors. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. Justice Brennan
joined in the majority opinion but supplied a concurring opinion as well.
Justice Marshall dissented.
Characterizing SIPC's argument that the Court should imply a private
right of action on tort principles as entirely misplaced, Justice Rehnquist
stressed that recognition of a statutory cause of action is a matter of con-
struction which begins with the statutory language and ultimately is lim-
ited to determining whether Congress intended to create the asserted
cause of action. 92 He noted that section 17(a) governs broker-dealers as
opposed to auditors, does not purport to create private causes of action,
and is like "countless other statutes" demanding record-keeping and re-
porting. Further, the purpose of the desired data assembly is to provide
relevant authorities with an early warning9 s and the legislative history is
devoid of suggestion of a private cause of action whereas false reporting is
the subject of a private right of action expressed in section 18(a) of the
'34 Act.19
In summary, Justice Rehnquist demolished any basis for inferring a
cause of action. Doing so, he implicitly denied vitality of the long stand-
ing section 6 theory1' as well as Kardon's suggestion that defendants
have a burden "to negative what the general law implied." 9 6 Justice
Rehnquist sensibly pointed out that Cort's factors cannot be weighed
" 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1979).
'"Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 592 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S.
904 (1979).
"' 428 F. Supp. 483, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
192 442 U.S. at 568.
'3 Id. at 570.
1" 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). In order to proceed under § 18, a plaintiff must have
relied on a misrepresentation in purchasing or selling a security, and the misrepresentation
must have affected the value of the security. A defendant may escape liability with the
affnmative defense that he acted in good faith and without knowledge of the inaccuracy of
his statements. Id.
I" See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944);
see text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
'" See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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equally since the "central inquiry" is whether Congress intended a cause
of action. The first three Cort factors, he opined, are ones traditionally
relied on in identifying legislative intent.197 While Borak was preserved
from explicit repudiation,"'8 the majority opinion dryly noted that the
Court now has a stricter standard which does not involve an estimate of
the judiciary's ability to "improve upon the legislative scheme."' 99
Concurring, Justice Brennan clung to Rigsby's "especial benefit" lan-
guage but observed that the third and fourth Cort factors are not "by
themselves" an adequate basis for inferring a "right of action."2 0 Justice
Marshall, as did Justice Clark in Borak, used section 17(a)'s "protection
of investors" delegation standard as a springboard from which to leap to
a legislative intention to afford private causes of action for investors and,
as in Touche Ross, their representatives. He cleverly employed the dele-
gation standard to meet the first Cort inquiry as to "especial benefit. 2 0 1
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis' 0' represents a sub-
stantial survival of the vintage 1941 Geismar analysis' 0 3-- to the degree it
led to equity. Twice argued before the Court, Transamerica was a five to
four decision. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion in which Justice
Powell joined whilst unable to resist separate characterization of the ma-
jority opinion as compatible with his dissent in Cannon .20 A dissent by
Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
Subjects of debate between the camps ran to both causes of action and
remedies.
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940205 characterizes
various actions as unlawful but does not explicitly provide a private cause
of action. Section 215 of the Act 208 which is analogous to section 29(a) of
'9 442 U.s. at 575-76.
iS8 Id. at 577.
199 Id. After Touche Ross, viability of the Court's reasoning in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), is suspect. See text accompanying notes 98-103 supra. Indeed, the prin-
cipal support for an implied private right of action under § 14(a) of the '34 Act appears to
be the fact that Congress has not legislatively repealed the Borak dictum despite repeated
opportunities to do so in the sixteen years following that decision. The language of Rule
14a-9, however, when considered in the context of the approach to Rule 10b-5 adopted in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), suggests that the vitality of a § 14(a)
private cause of action may be conditioned upon proof that defendant acted with scienter.
Compare Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) and Gould v. American
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 858-65 (D. Del. 1972) (negligence sufficient to establish
§ 14(a) violation) with Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,382, at 97,514 (6th Cir. 1980) (scienter is requisite culpability
standard in § 14(a) actions).
11* 442 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 580-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
202 100 S.Ct. 243 (1979).
22 See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
2" 100 S.Ct. at 246.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
204 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
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the '34 Act,207 states that contracts violative of the Advisers Act are void
with respect to the violator and those claiming under the violator.
Characterizing the legislative history of section 206 as reflecting an in-
tent "to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations", Justice Stewart noted
the history's silence as to enforcement through private litigation. This,
however, was not taken automatically to undermine any thought of a pri-
vate remedy.208 Citing to Kardon (while ignoring its endorsement of Geis-
mar's induction of damages) and accepting that section 215 implies an
action for rescission or similar relief209 in context of the Act's provision of
penal,210 injunctive21 and administrative 1 2 sanctions, Justice Stewart
qualifiedly invoked an anglicized complement to the expressio unius
maxim to deny a damage remedy under section 206:
'When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it
includes the negative of any other mode' Botany Mills v. [U.S.],
278 U.S. 282, 289... (1929) .... Even settled rules of statutory
construction could yield... to persuasive evidence of a contrary
legislative intent.21 3
Plaintiff was unable to adduce that evidence. Speaking to Cort-based ar-
guments, the Transamerica majority cited Touche Ross for the proposi-
tion that recognition of a statutory purpose to protect advisers' clients
does not mandate inference of a private cause of action. 21 4 Thus, the pri-
mary/secondary objective test suggested by Cort21 5 is impeached.
Justice White can be suspected of revisionist tendencies. Perhaps sen-
sitive to his fellow Cannon dissenter's disdain for the purposes to which
past decisions have used Rigsby,218 Justice White neatly recharacterizes
Rigsby as Supreme Court recognition of the role of implied private rights
of action at "the not infrequent common law. ' 211 This, of course, does not
deny that Rigsby is a negligence per se case. He characterizes Cort as
outlining the preferred mode for determining whether a federal statute
implies a private cause of action 218 and maintains that all four factors are
satisfied by plaintiff's theory of action. None would doubt that the plain-
tiff was one of the protected class. Justice White finds no controlling in-
tent to foreclose private actions;219 rather, the majority's recognition of an
10 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
28 100 S.Ct. at 246.
209 Id.
210 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976).
21 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(c) (1976).
212 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (1976).
313 100 S.Ct. at 247.
214 Id. at 249.
115 422 U.S. at 80.
216 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732, 737-38 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
17 100 S.Ct. at 250 n.2.
215 Id. at 250.
219 Id. at 251.
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equitable remedy estabishes existence of a cause of action which triggers
"wide" judicial discretion in fashioning relief.220 He would have it that a
private damage action is compatible with the legislative scheme in satis-
faction of the "third portion of the Cort standard." 221Fiduciary standards
for investment advisers, the dissent suggests, are not yet common among
the states.222 Evolution of Cort's "relevant factors" to a standard is an
interesting phenomenon.
IV. The Future
A pendulum has swung. Whether it has swung too far is a matter of
debate. Indeed, debate is proper concerning where, in its path, the pendu-
lum is. While Justice Powell is correct when he worries about a Borak in
terms of separation of powers, it would be troublesome to dispense with
the potential for inferring causes of action from the Constitution and
legislation.
In the final analysis, we must rely on the collective good sense of the
Court since bright line tests for mandatory inference are impossible. The
Court has no warrant again to invite permissive inference from latterly-
perceived versions of the spirit of complex legislation.
The author is quite content with the fact of a distinction between the
imperatives for inferring private causes from the Constitution and legisla-
tion. Doctrines of necessarily implied powers serve the federal judiciary,
as well as its coordinates, in accomplishing the ends of the Constitutional
structure. There is, however, no generalized implication of power for the
judiciary to supplement Congress' efforts. Fortunately, Congress has both
the opportunity and the staffing to accomplish the oversight function nec-
essary to ensure effectiveness of its legislation. Thus, a judicially adminis-
tered oversight function is not needed and cannot be deemed an implied
judicial power.
However, it is quite predictable that the justifiably active judicial role
taken in connection with denial of individuals' constitutional rights, and
some of the language used in this activism, will tempt to a reobfuscation
and consequent relaxation of the properly demanding tack the Court has
taken with regard to causes of action and remedies allegedly implied by
statute. Courts should be aware that it is more important to be rigorous
when considering the existence of substantive rules of decision rather
than it is when considering availability of remedies appropriate to acquit-
ting undoubted rights. Offhandedly creating causes of action, with invoca-
tions about duties to supplement Congress' efforts, is offensive to Con-
20 Id. at 251-52. Note, in context of Borak's use of a jurisdictional grant to imply a
private cause of action for violation of a substantive section, Justice White's alertness to
restrict use of a comparable provision in the Advisers Act. Id. at 254.
2,1 Id. at 254-55.
222 Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25230-37, 25400(d) (West Supp. 1980) with PA. CONST.
STAT. §§ 102(j), 301, 303-05, 401-02, 404-05, 501 (1978). See also L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON
THE UNIFORM SECURITIEs AcT (1976).
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gress' law-making power. Generating remedies under existing grants of
general jurisdiction is not inherently offensive although, on occasion, in-
fringements may occur. Induction from general availability of forums and
remedy structures to the existence of substantive rules of decision is con-
stitutionally reprehensible.
Due to the recency of reform and the advanced ages of various of the
principal actors, only general trends in the Court can be remarked with
any certainty. In Transamerica, Justice Brennan experienced the major-
ity turning his entirely valid distinctions between causes of action and
remedies against a plaintiff who, a few short years ago, would have en-
joyed a damage action without the extremism permitted by Borak. The
positioning and rhetoric of Justice White in University of California v.
Bakke,223 Santa Fe, Cannon and Transamerica provide a clue to a coun-
terattack of sorts on the new demands for rigor. In Bakke, he argued
against inference of a private Title VI cause of action.224 In Cannon, he
was quite persuasive as to Congress' intent to avoid private causes of ac-
tion under the ice-breaking Title IX in favor of sensitive administrative
action.225 In Santa Fe, he wrote for the majority and did so in highly
analytical terms. So analytical was he that he ignored, not that it would
or should have changed the outcome, the absence of a judicial forum in
which a shareholder only unfairly squeezed-out could argue breach of
fiduciary duty.226 Yet, in Transamerica, Justice White is a revised Cort
ideologue and one who can ignore the fact that many states understand
the fiduciary relationship implicit in investment advising.227 The possibil-
ity exists that he was pinch-hitting for another Justice. Surely, in the Su-
preme Court, there are no ego drives sufficient to compel ambition to be
the leader of an ideological grouping for the sole purpose of being ac-
knowledged as leader of a group. Assuming that he was not pinch-hitting
and that he has no need to be an acknowledged pack leader, Justice
White's brilliance is such as to permit the inference that he may have
decided to damp the pendulum a mite. Could Transamerica's equity
compartmentalization of an acknowledged right have prompted him to
adopt this position?
In any event, there is now clear distinction between private causes of
action and remedies implied by statutes. The key is legislative intent for
which traditional tools of statutory construction are once again
mandatory. There is an unstated consensus that the days of courts' being
alert to improve on Congress' handiwork are past. District and circuit
court judges are on notice that reflexive adoption of ingenious theories of
223 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
224 Id. at 387.
215 442 U.S. at 719.
226 430 U.S. at 477-80. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 80 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), which held that
Delaware courts must assess the fairness of contested short-form mergers, id. at 976, was
decided shortly after Santa Fe.
227 100 S.Ct. at 252-54.
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action is no longer fashionable and that judicial homework is both ex-
pected and required.228
218 For an excellent example of judicious consideration of an alleged private right of
action, see Judge Russell's opinion in Stern v. Merrill Lynch, 603 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting what amounted to a dram-shop theory asserted under § 7(c) of the '34 Act and
Regulation T).
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